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ARTICLE 
The Compensation Trap: 
The Limits of Community-Based Pollution 
Regulation in China 
BENJAMIN VAN ROOIJ, ANNA LORA WAINWRIGHT, YUNMEI WU, & 
YIYUN (AMY) ZHANG* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Pollution Regulation in Emerging Markets 
The control of environmental risks increasingly demands 
effective regulation in “industrializing countries” such as India, 
Brazil, and China.  The global integration, economic growth, 
agricultural commercialization, urbanization, and 
industrialization of these countries have shifted the worst 
environmental hazards from the industrialized to the 
industrializing world.  Consider, for example, the daunting scale 
of pollution in China; according to recent estimates, it causes 
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750,000 premature deaths annually.1  About 300 million Chinese 
people drink contaminated water on a daily basis, and 190 million 
of them suffer from related illnesses.2  Moreover, sixteen of the 
world’s twenty most polluted cities are in China.3  Neighbors 
including Russia, South Korea, and Japan have long suffered 
from China’s pollution, which increasingly influences more 
distant regions.  A striking example is that on some days, 
according to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
twenty-five percent of suspended air particulates in Los Angeles 
originate from the People’s Republic.4  China also became a 
dominant factor in global climate change when it surpassed the 
U.S. in 2006 as the world’s number one producer of greenhouse 
gases.5 
To control environmental risks, industrialized countries that 
are part of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD) have applied a combination of regulatory 
instruments but with mixed success.  Direct legal instruments, in 
which a government sets standards and issues permits to 
polluting facilities, dominated the early regulatory landscape.6  In 
later years, economic market-based instruments, such as 
discharge fees, pollution taxes, and emissions trading systems, 
 
 1. Richard McGregor, 750,000 a Year Killed by Chinese Pollution, FIN. 
TIMES (July 2, 2007), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8f40e248-28c7-11dc-af78-
000b5df10621.html. See generally WORLD BANK & STATE ENVTL. PROT. ADMIN., 
COSTS OF POLLUTION IN CHINA: ECONOMIC ESTIMATES OF PHYSICAL DAMAGES 
(2007), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
INTEAPREGTOPENVIRONMENT/ Resources/China_Cost_of_Pollution.pdf. 
 2. ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD ENVIRONMENTAL 
PERFORMANCE REVIEW: CHINA 239 (2007) [hereinafter OECD PERFORMANCE 
REVIEW], available at http://www.efchina.org/csepupfiles/report/ 
200812095029729.8523773582758.pdf/Environmental%20Performance%20Revie
w%20-%20China%2007-23-07.pdf. 
 3. Elizabeth C. Economy, The Great Leap Backward? The Costs of China's 
Environmental Crisis, 86 FOREIGN AFF. 38, 40 (2007). 
 4. Id. at 44. 
 5. China Now No. 1 in CO2 Emissions; USA in Second Position, PBL NETH. 
ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AGENCY, http://www.pbl.nl/en/dossiers/Climatechange/ 
moreinfo/Chinanowno1inCO2emissionsUSAinsecondposition (last visited Mar. 
18, 2012). 
 6. See generally EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: 
THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982); NEIL GUNNINGHAM ET 
AL., SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1998). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss3/2
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were incorporated into regulatory frameworks.7  In addition to 
mandatory approaches, OECD countries have also experimented 
with a wide range of voluntary or semi-voluntary programs, such 
as certification and public disclosure, as well as quasi-voluntary 
methods, such as environmental covenants and government-
sponsored self-regulatory mechanisms.8  Industrializing 
countries, which are not a part of the OECD, have copied these 
regulatory instruments, but effective implementation has been 
difficult, leaving national and global risks under-regulated.9 
A limited law enforcement capacity and low levels of 
compliance are factors that explain why environmental 
regulation in industrializing countries has been inadequate.10  
 
 7. See generally ALBERT WEALE, THE NEW POLITICS OF POLLUTION (1992); 
TOM H. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (2006). 
 8. See, e.g., REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE: CAN ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ACHIEVE POLICY GOALS? (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer 
Nash eds., 2001); GUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 6. 
 9. See, e.g., DARA O'ROURKE, COMMUNITY-DRIVEN REGULATION: BALANCING 
DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN VIETNAM (2004); LESLEY K. MCALLISTER, 
MAKING LAW MATTER: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN 
BRAZIL (2008); Adriaan Bedner, Consequences of Decentralization: 
Environmental Impact Assessment and Water Pollution Control in Indonesia, 32 
LAW & POL’Y  38 (2010); ALLEN BLACKMAN, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, DISCUSSION 
PAPER 00-02-REV, INFORMAL SECTOR POLLUTION CONTROL: WHAT POLICY OPTIONS 
DO WE HAVE? (2000), available at http://www.jac-ccc.org/PDN-ARP/RFF/ 
BLACKMAN.PDF; ALLEN BLACKMAN, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, DISCUSSION PAPER 
05-31, COLOMBIA'S DISCHARGE FEE PROGRAM: INCENTIVES FOR POLLUTERS OR 
REGULATORS? (2005), available at http://www.mamacoca.org/docs_de_base/ 
Fumigas/rff-dp-05-31.pdf; Allen Blackman, Introduction: Small Firms and the 
Environment in Developing Countries, in SMALL FIRMS AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: COLLECTIVE IMPACTS, COLLECTIVE ACTION 3 (Allen 
Blackman ed., RFF Press 2006) [hereinafter Blackman, Small Firms]; Benjamin 
van Rooij & Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, A Fragile Convergence: Understanding 
Variation in the Enforcement of China’s Industrial Pollution Law, 32 LAW & 
POL’Y 14 (2010); David Stuligross, The Political Economy of Environmental 
Regulation in India, 72 PAC. AFF. 392 (1999). 
 10. See generally JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT, REGULATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
(2005); Blackman, Small Firms, supra note 9; WORLD BANK, GREENING 
INDUSTRY: NEW ROLES FOR COMMUNITIES, MARKETS AND GOVERNMENTS (2000), 
available at http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK= 
64165259&theSitePK=469372&piPK=64165421&menuPK=64166093&entityID
=000094946_9911240530591; van Rooij & Lo, supra note 9; O'ROURKE, supra 
note 9; Lesley McAllister et al., Reorienting Regulation: Pollution Enforcement 
in Industrializing Countries, 32 LAW & POL’Y 1 (2010); MCALLISTER, supra note 
9. 
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China serves as an example; in many fields of regulation, 
including arable land protection,11 pollution,12 food safety,13 
mining,14 intellectual property rights,15 and labor,16 enforcement 
has been weak and violations widespread.  Low compliance and 
weak enforcement are mutually reinforcing, creating a vicious 
circle that undermines the implementation of any regulatory 
instrument, be it legal, economic, or voluntary.17  Such vicious 
circles are often embedded in and facilitated by a governance 
structure that is susceptible to the capture of state regulatory 
 
 11. See BENJAMIN VAN ROOIJ, REGULATING LAND AND POLLUTION IN CHINA: 
LAWMAKING, COMPLIANCE, AND ENFORCEMENT; THEORY AND CASES (2006), 
available at https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/5433/ 
Thesis.pdf?sequence=1%20. 
 12. See XIAOYING MA & LEONARD ORTOLANO, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN 
CHINA 182 (2000); ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 
ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA: AN ASSESSMENT OF 
CURRENT PRACTICES AND WAYS FORWARD 34 (2006); Bryan Tilt, The Political 
Ecology of Pollution Enforcement in China: A Case from Sichuan's Rural 
Industrial Sector, 192 CHINA Q. 915 (2007); VAN ROOIJ, supra note 11; OECD 
PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note 2. 
 13. See WORLD BANK, CHINA’S COMPLIANCE WITH FOOD SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 
FOR FRUITS AND VEGETABLES, PROMOTING FOOD SAFETY, COMPETITIVENESS, AND 
POVERTY REDUCTION (2007), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/ 
servlet/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSite
PK=523679&entityID=000310607_20070802162742; Aleda V. Roth et al., 
Unraveling the Food Supply Chain: Strategic Insights from China and the 2007 
Recalls, 44 J. SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT. 22 (2008); David Barboza, In Food Safety 
Crackdown, China Closes 180 Plants, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2007), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/27/world/asia/27cnd-
China.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=David%20Barboza,%20In%20Food%20Safety%20C
rackdown,%20China%20Closes%20180%20Plants,%20N.Y.%20TIMES,%20June
%2027%202007&st=cse. 
 14. See Tim Wright, The Political Economy of Coal Mine Disasters in China: 
“Your Rice Bowl or Your Life", 179 CHINA Q. 629 (2004). 
 15. See ANDREW C. MERTHA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (2005). 
 16. See Sean Cooney, China's Labour Law, Compliance and Flaws in 
Implementing Institutions, 49 J. INDUS. REL. 673 (2007); Sean Cooney, Making 
Chinese Labor Law Work: The Prospects for Regulatory Innovation in the 
People's Republic of China, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1050 (2007). 
 17. See generally Gjalt Huppes & Robert A. Kagan, Market-Oriented 
Regulation of Environmental Problems in the Netherlands, 11 J.L. & POL’Y 215 
(1989); Darren Sinclair, Self-Regulation Versus Command and Control? Beyond 
False Dichotomies, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 529 (1997). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss3/2
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institutions by business elites.18  Several factors, including the 
unclear demarcation between state and market institutions,19 the 
state’s lack of steering and coordinating capacity,20 and the 
dominance of informal networks over formal legal structures21 
can foster this capture. 
To deal with the increasingly worrying levels of pollution 
from industrializing countries, we need to understand how 
regulatory instruments can be effective when there is a vicious 
circle of low compliance and weak enforcement occurring in 
capture-prone governance contexts.  This necessitates a 
reorientation of regulatory theory, shifting the focus from 
industrialized to industrializing countries, concentrating on how 
regulation functions and how it can be improved when compliance 
levels and enforcement capacity are low, and studying regulatory 
design and implementation in governance settings where 
business and regulators are closely aligned.22 
B. Citizen-Based Pollution Regulation as a Solution? 
One idea23 for breaking through the regulatory deadlock that 
so often exists in industrializing countries is to expand the 
 
 18. See Clifford Russell & William Vaughan, The Choice of Pollution Control 
Policy Instruments in Developing Countries: Arguments, Evidence and 
Suggestions, in THE INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
RESOURCE ECONOMICS 2003/2004 (Henk Folmer & Tom Tietenberg eds., 2003). 
 19. See, e.g., TONY SAICH, GOVERNANCE AND POLITICS OF CHINA (1st ed. 2001); 
RICHARD ROBISON & VEDI HADIZ, REORGANISING POWER IN INDONESIA: THE 
POLITICS OF OLIGARCHY IN AN AGE OF MARKETS (2004); Susanna B. Hecht, 
Soybeans, Development and Conservation on the Amazon Frontier, 36 DEV. & 
CHANGE 375 (2005). 
 20. See Henk Schulte Nordholt, Renegotiating Boundaries: Access, Agency 
and Identity in Post-Soeharto Indonesia, 159 BIJDRAGEN TOT DE TAAL-, LAND- EN 
VOLKENKUNDE 550, 570 (2003); Andrew C. Mertha, China's "Soft" 
Centralization: Shifting Tiao/Kuai Authority Relations, 184 CHINA Q. 791, 792 
(2005); see also MCALLISTER, supra note 9. 
 21. See Tim Lindsey, The Criminal State: Premanisme and the New 
Indonesia, in INDONESIA TODAY: CHALLENGES OF HIST. (Grayson J. Lloyd & 
Shannon L. Smith eds., 2001); Mayfair Mei-hui Yang, The Resilience of Guanxi 
and Its New Deployments: A Critique of Some New Guanxi Scholarship, 170 
CHINA Q. 459, 465 (2002); see also KATHRYN HOCHSTETLER & MARGARET E. KECK, 
GREENING BRAZIL: ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM IN STATE AND SOCIETY (2007). 
 22. See McAllister et al., supra note 10. 
 23. Another idea is the introduction of market-based instruments. 
5
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regulatory space for non-state actors such as consumers, NGOs, 
and local communities.24  By involving these non-state actors, 
less state capacity is needed and capture-type state-business 
relations can be circumvented through the force of a relatively 
independent civil society.  Citizen complaints can add inspection 
capacity to aid state regulators.  Citizens can oversee captured 
state regulators and pressure them into action through legal and 
political means.  They can also help to enhance the legitimacy for 
environmental regulation and support weak environmental 
regulators.  Citizens can directly act as regulators by exerting 
pressure on polluting firms through legal or political means.  
That said, we know from the broader literature that community-
based pollution regulation is not a panacea and it requires certain 
conditions to be successful.  We know that the higher the income, 
the level of awareness, the independency of local industry, and 
the capacity for organization and leadership, the more likely 
citizen efforts are to succeed.25  Furthermore, we know that 
successful community regulation requires support from state and 
civil society organizations.26  These attributes may be 
particularly lacking in rural communities located in rapidly 
developing and industrializing countries of the South, and thus, 
the promise of community regulation may go unfulfilled. 
 
 24. See Blackman, Small Firms, supra note 9, at 1; O'ROURKE, supra note 9, 
at 6, 14; NEIL GUNNINGHAM ET AL., SHADES OF GREEN: BUSINESS, REGULATION, 
AND ENVIRONMENT 53-153 (Stanford Univ. Press 2003); Bridget M. Hutter & 
Clive J. Jones, From Government to Governance: External Influences on Business 
Risk Management, 1 REG. & GOVERNANCE 32-36 (2007); Neil Gunningham, 
Regulating Small and Medium Sized Enterprises, 14 J. ENVTL. L. 3-32 (2002). 
See generally BRIDGET M. HUTTER, CTR. FOR ANALYSIS OF RISK & REG., ECON. & 
SOC. RES. COUNCIL, THE ROLE OF NON-STATE ACTORS IN REGULATION (2006), 
available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/36118/1/Disspaper37.pdf; BRIDGET M. 
HUTTER & JOAN O'MAHONY, CTR. FOR ANALYSIS OF RISK & REG., ECON. & SOC. 
RES. COUNCIL, THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS IN REGULATING 
BUSINESS (2004), available at http://www2.lse.ac.uk/researchAndExpertise/ 
units/CARR/pdf/DPs/Disspaper26.pdf; SHAKEB AFSAH ET AL., RES. FOR THE 
FUTURE, HOW DO PUBLIC DISCLOSURE CONTROL PROGRAMS WORK? EVIDENCE FROM 
INDONESIA (2000), available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-00-
44.pdf. 
 25. Benjamin van Rooij, The People Vs. Pollution: Understanding Citizen 
Action Against Pollution in China, 19 J. CONTEM. CHINA 55, 63-65 (2010). 
 26. See generally O'ROURKE, supra note 9; Benjamin van Rooij, Greening 
Industry Without Enforcement? An Assessment of the World Bank's Pollution 
Regulation Model for Developing Countries, 32 J.L. & POL’Y 1 (2010). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss3/2
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In the last decade, China has expanded the possibilities for 
citizen-based pollution regulation.  China has expanded the legal 
possibilities for pollution compensation redress27 through 
reversing the burden of proof of causation,28 allowing collective 
action with multiple plaintiffs,29 introducing disclosure systems,30 
expanding public participation in environmental impact 
assessments,31 and introducing a system providing for the right 
to environmental information.32  The state has also made efforts 
 
 27. For an elaborate discussion of this, see Benjamin van Rooij, The People's 
Regulation: Citizens and Implementation of Law in China, 25 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 
(forthcoming Aug. 2012). 
 28. See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Shui Wu Ran Fang Zhi Fa (中
华人民共和国水污染防治法) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on the 
Prevention and Control of Water Pollution] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. of the Sixth Nat’l People’s Cong., May. 11, 1984, amended pursuant to 
the Decision on Amending the Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
Prevention and Control of Water Pollution adopted at the 19th meeting of the 
Standing Committee of the Eight National People’s Congress on May 15, 1996, 
and amended at the 32nd meeting of the Standing Committee of the Tenth 
National People’s Congress on Feb. 28, 2008) art  87 (China); Zhong Hua Ren 
Min Gong He Guo Gu Ti Fei Wu Fang Zhi Fa (中华人民共和国固体废物防治法) 
[Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of Solid 
Waste] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Eight Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Oct. 30, 1995, amended pursuant to the Decision on Amending the Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution 
adopted at the 13th meeting of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National 
People’s Congress on Dec. 29, 2004) art. 86 (China); Zui Gao Ren Min Fa Yuan 
Guan Yu Min Shi Su Song Zheng Ju de Ruo Gan Gui Ding (最高人民法院
关于民事诉讼证据的若干规定) [Supreme People’s Court Various Regulations 
Rgearding Evidence for Civil Suits] (promulgated by the Sup. Peoples’Ct. Dec. 6, 
2001, effective Apr. 1, 2002) art. 4 section 3 (China). 
 29. See Zhong Hua Ren Min Min Shi Su Song Fa (中华人民共和国民事诉讼法) 
[Law of the People’s Republic of China on Civil Procedure] (promulgated by the 
seventh Nat’l People’s Cong. at the 4th Plenary Apr. 9, 1991, amended pursuant 
to the decision on Amending the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Civil 
Procedure adopted at the 13th meeting of the Standing Committee of the Tenth 
Nat’l People’s Congress on Oct. 28, 2007) art 53 (China); Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution, supra note 
28, at art. 88. 
 30. See generally Hua Wang et al., Environmental Performance Rating and 
Disclosure: China's Green-Watch Program (World Bank, Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 2889, 2002), available at http://www-wds. worldbank.org/ 
servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2002/10/18/000094946_02100304104987/a
dditional/126526322_20041117182557.pdf. 
 31. See generally VAN ROOIJ, supra note 11. 
 32. See JAMIE P. HORSLEY, CHINA L. CTR., YALE L. SCH., UPDATE ON CHINA’S 
OPEN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION REGULATIONS: SURPRISING PUBLIC DEMAND 
7
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to engage citizens in its law enforcement work, establishing 
special complaint hotlines, offering rewards for reliable citizen 
information about pollution, and getting citizens involved in 
pollution enforcement campaigns targeted at citizen grievances.33  
Meanwhile, Chinese environmental civil society organizations 
have become increasingly active in aiding and stimulating 
citizens to take action against pollution.34 
These measures seem to have had some effect.  There is 
increasing evidence that, despite limited political freedom and a 
non-independent judiciary, Chinese citizens living in the vicinity 
of polluting enterprises have become increasingly activist – 
helped in part by China’s growing environmental NGO 
movement.35  For instance, citizens have sued chemical plants 
responsible for destroying their fishponds.  They have voiced 
formal complaints demanding enforcement action from 
environmental authorities.  They have petitioned other local and 
national government institutions, going all the way to Beijing.  
Lastly, citizens have organized mass demonstrations against 
pollution.36  Citizens play an increasingly important role in 
Chinese pollution regulation, and the numbers prove it.  In 2006, 
Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs) in China received 
616,122 complaints and petitions from citizens concerning 
 
YIELDING SOME POSITIVE RESULTS 2 (2010), available at http://www. 
law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Intellectual_Life/CL-
OGI_Update_for_freedominfo_Horsley_article_4-6-10.pdf. 
 33. See VAN ROOIJ, supra note 11, ch. 14. 
 34. See generally van Rooij, supra note 25. 
 35. See Peter Ho, Greening without Conflict? Environmentalism, NGOs and 
Civil Society in China, 32 DEV. & CHANGE 893, 899-900 (2001). See generally 
CHINA'S EMBEDDED ACTIVISM: OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS OF A SOCIAL 
MOVEMENT (Peter Ho & Richard Louis Edmonds eds., 2008) (laying out an 
overview of Chinese Environmental NGOs); Guobin Yang, Environmental NGOs 
and Institutional Dynamics in China, 46 CHINA Q. 181 (2005). 
 36. See William P. Alford et al., The Human Dimensions of Pollution Policy 
Implementation: Air Quality in Rural China, 11 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 32 (2002); 
Jun Jing, Environmental Protests in China, in CHINESE SOCIETY: CHANGE, 
CONFLICT AND RESISTANCE 197, 200-02 (Elisabeth J. Perry & Mark Selden eds., 
2004). See generally ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK: THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE TO CHINA'S FUTURE (2004); VAN ROOIJ, supra note 
11; Anna M. Brettell, The Politics of Public Participation and the Emergence of 
Environmental Proto-Movements in China (Dec. 9, 2003) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Maryland) (on file with the University of Maryland). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss3/2
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pollution37 compared to 247,741 in 2000.  Meanwhile, the State 
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) stated that 
over 510,000 cases of “public conflict” had been initiated in 2005 
by “severe environmental problems” that threatened social 
stability.38  Citizens have even tried to sue polluters in China’s 
notoriously inaccessible and protectionist courts: the number of 
cases has fluctuated, with 2,146 cases nationwide in 2006, 
compared to 4,453 and 1,545 in 2004 and 2005, respectively.39 
Most analyses of citizen activism against pollution have 
looked at court cases,40 at the effects of complaints on 
enforcement,41 or at linkages between income levels, pollution 
levels, and complaints.42  Generally, we know that citizens in 
China, as elsewhere, require a certain amount of independence 
from the local industry to take action.43  We also know that 
knowledge about pollution need not lead to the development of a 
cause for complaint and a resultant course of action.44  We 
understand that local governments and industries can obstruct 
citizens attempting to take action, while legal aid centers and the 
 
 37. STATE ENVTL. PROT. ADMIN., ZHONGGUO HUANJING TONGJI NIANBAO 2006 
[CHINA ENVIRONMENT STATISTICAL REPORT 2006] (2007). 
 38. Officials: Environmental Deterioration Threatens Social Stability, BBC 
CHINESE. COM, (Apr. 19, 2006, 4:10 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/chinese/ 
simp/low/newsid_4920000/newsid_4923800/4923810.stm. 
 39. Representative Mei Lüzhong: Recommendations on the Establishment of 
Environmental Tribunals, XINHUA (Mar. 8, 2008, 4:49 PM), http://news. 
xinhuanet.com/misc/2008-03/08/content_7746377.htm. 
 40. See generally Rachel E. Stern, On the Frontlines: Making Decisions in 
Chinese Civil Environmental Lawsuits, 32 LAW & POL’Y 79 (2010); van Rooij, 
supra note 25; Alex Wang, The Role of Law in Environmental Protection in 
China: Recent Developments, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 195, 207 (2007). 
 41. See, e.g., van Rooij & Lo, supra note 9, at 22; Carlos Wing Hung Lo & Sai 
Wing Leung, Environmental Agency and Public Opinion in Guangzhou: The 
Limits of a Popular Approach to Environmental Governance, 163 CHINA Q. 677, 
680 (2000). See generally Carlos Wing-Hung Lo & Gerald Erick Fryxell, 
Governmental and Societal Support for Environmental Enforcement in China: 
An Empirical Study in Guangzhou, 41 J. DEV. STUD. 558 (2005). 
 42. van Rooij & Lo, supra note 9, at 24. 
 43. van Rooij, supra note 25, at 61. 
 44. Id. at 61-62. 
9
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media can be very helpful, if the citizens can get them to help 
out.45 
C. Aims, Methods, and Outline 
Existing studies offer a limited view of citizen-based pollution 
regulation.  An initial problem is that existing data and analyses 
tell us little about how citizens are moved to take action and 
assume a regulatory role.  We understand little about the 
interaction between the citizens, the factories involved, and local 
state actors.  Few of them have looked in depth at how citizens 
perceive pollution problems and how such awareness translates 
into courses of action.46  Moreover, existing studies have been 
biased towards cases in which citizens took action outside of their 
own locality.  These studies fail to inform us of cases where 
citizens either did not take action or took action only through 
localized negotiations or protests that were not covered by the 
media.  Michelson’s work on dispute processing in China 
demonstrates that there are many citizens with grievances who 
do not take action outside their locality, either putting up with 
such problems or seeking local options.47 
Against the background of the promises and challenges of 
community-based regulation and the limitations of existing 
research, this article presents a unique in-depth analysis of a 
localized pattern of citizen involvement in pollution regulation.  
This pattern, which is drawn from a detailed ethnographic case 
study of one locality in southwestern China, has three aspects.  
First, despite a well-developed awareness of pollution related 
 
 45. Id. at 62; see also Kathinka Fürst, Access to Justice in Environmental 
Disputes: Opportunities and Obstacles for Chinese Pollution Victims (2008) 
(unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Oslo) (on file with author). 
 46. See, e.g., Anna Lora-Wainwright, An Anthropology of ‘Cancer Villages’: 
Villagers’ Perspectives and the Politics of Responsibility, 19 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 
79 (2010); Jing, supra note 36; Bryan Tilt, Perceptions of Risk from the 
Industrial Pollution in China: A Comparison of Occupational Groups, 65 HUM. 
ORG. 115 (2006); Alford et al., supra note 36. 
 47. See Ethan Michelson, Climbing the Dispute Pagoda: Grievances and 
Appeals to the Official Justice System in Rural China, 72 AM. SOC. REV. 459 
(2007) [hereinafter Michelson, Climbing the Dispute Pagoda]; Ethan Michelson, 
Justice From Above or Below? Popular Strategies for Resolving Grievances in 
Rural China, 193 CHINA Q. 43 (2008). 
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damage,48 citizens have only made limited use of the possible 
avenues open to them to deal with pollution.  In one instance, 
citizen action was undertaken in a locally isolated manner at the 
village or town level, and consisted chiefly of negotiation and 
collective action.  Citizens did not initiate legal action; they did 
not seek advice from lawyers; they did not file a complaint with 
the environmental protection authorities; they did not contact one 
of the environmental legal aid centers, and they did not seek the 
help of the media, even when the media came to speak to them.49  
Second, citizen demands largely focused on redress rather than 
ending or preventing the environmental damage.  Third, citizen 
action resulted in compensation, not regulation; the years of 
collective action and negotiation resulted in minor pay-offs that 
barely covered the costs of pollution and had no effect on the 
pollution control of the factories involved.  This pattern has 
proved resilient, despite its limited effects to control pollution or 
even to get sufficient compensation. 
The study of this pattern offers us a unique first insight into 
how and why citizens have organized localized forms of activism 
to deal with pollution, which has so far been left largely 
unexamined.  This view is unique as it goes beyond studies that 
are based on cases reported in the media, in court, or in 
governmental records.  If all instances of citizen-based pollution 
regulation are an iceberg, the cases studied so far are just the tip 
that is visible above the water.  The pattern of localized 
regulation studied in this paper is the part that has remained 
obscured under the water.  Since we lack data, there is no way of 
knowing how such an iceberg is shaped, whether it is a pyramid, 
a cone, or some form of a rectangle.  We can guess that the 
pattern studied here is not exceptional.  As we know from 
Michelson’s quantitative study of dispute processing in China, 
many citizens take no action (thirty-three percent) or just 
bilateral action negotiating with the person they deem 
 
 48. See Anna Lora-Wainwright, Collective Illness Experiences and Individual 
Uncertainty: Rural Industrial Pollution and Lay Epidemiology in China 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 49. On this process, see Anna Lora-Wainwright et al., Learning to Live with 
Pollution: The Making of Environmental Subjects in a Chinese Industrialised 
Village, 68 CHINA J. (forthcoming July 2012). 
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responsible for their grievances (forty-seven percent)50, and if 
they do, many take localized forms of action.51 
This article seeks to understand this particular pattern of 
citizen-based pollution regulation.  It explores why it developed 
and what sustains it.  This article derives lessons about the 
possibilities and conditions for pollution regulation in similar 
contexts.  It argues that the social, economic, and political 
contexts in the local community are deeply affected by the 
processes of industrialization that in turn give rise to a particular 
form of community-based pollution regulation.  In this form, 
monetary redress for damages caused by industrial activities – 
whether pollution or loss of land – becomes an overarching end.  
It reframes the way damages are viewed and grievances are 
developed, limiting the courses of action that could be taken and 
restraining the outcomes of such action.  We find that in this 
case, industrialization developed into a “compensation trap,” 
where activism became passivism, where solidarity was replaced 
by opportunism, and where awareness about the dangers of 
pollution could not translate into effective demands to control or 
decrease discharges.  The paper analyzes how the compensation 
trap developed and through inference draws larger lessons for 
pollution regulation in China and countries with similar 
contexts.52 
Apart from the large body of academic knowledge on 
pollution regulation and citizen activism, the article draws on 
insights from Gaventa’s work, which studies the historical 
formation of power and powerlessness in an industrial 
community53.  Gaventa teaches the importance of industrial 
stratification and the vital role that framing structures54 can 
 
 50. See Michelson, Climbing the Dispute Pagoda, supra note 47, at 466. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Awareness levels can vary significantly, and it is worth considering 
whether more detailed knowledge about the risks entailed by pollution would 
translate into action. 
 53. JOHN GAVENTA, POWER AND POWERLESSNESS, QUIESCENCE AND REBELLION 
IN AN APPALACHIAN VALLEY   (Clarendon Press. 1980). 
 54. Framing structures indicate the discursive frames through which people 
see, understand, and discuss social reality. See generally Maarten Hajer, 
Discourse Analysis and the Study of Policy Making, EUROPEAN POL. SCI., 
Autumn 2002, at 61. 
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have on particular instances of agency.  The article also draws 
from power theorists about the organizational,55 behavioral,56 
and exclusionary57 aspects of how power shapes activism, as well 
as the framing aspects of power when a structure of thought58 or 
routine59 influences grievance development and courses of action. 
This study is based on data collected in 2009 through 
extensive fieldwork carried out in five sub-villages in 
southwestern China, with an in-depth study of two of them.  The 
team of researchers included social scientists, lawyers, and 
medical experts.  The fieldwork methodology was anthropological 
in nature, consisting of semi-structured interviews, both long and 
short, and ranging from semi-formal to highly informal, as well as 
observations made during the weeks living in the local village.  
Additional data was gathered earlier in 2004 when an initial 
study was done on state regulation, which included interviews 
with relevant state enforcement agents, village leaders, and a 
limited number of villagers.60  For the sake of confidentiality, all 
names of persons and places have been changed. 
The remainder of this article consists of three sections 
detailing what we have identified as the three stages of 
community-based regulation: (1) industrial compensation in the 
planned economy; (2) compensation contracts and collective 
action; and (3) resource capitalism and opportunist acquiescence.  
These three stages should not be seen as strict chronological 
 
 55. See BARRY BARNES, THE NATURE OF POWER (1988). 
 56. See Robert A. Dahl, The Concept of Power, 2 BEHAV. SCI. 201, 202-04 
(1957); ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?: DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN 
CITY (1961); ROBERT A. DAHL, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 408 (David S. Sills ed., 1968). 
 57. See Peter Bachrach & Morton S. Baratz, Two Faces of Power, 56 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 947, 949 (1962); ELMER E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN 
PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1960). 
 58. See generally STEVEN LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW 34-35 (1st ed. 1974); 
MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE 
AGE OF REASON (1965); ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY: 
OUTLINE OF THE THEORY OF STRUCTURATION (1984). 
 59. See generally GIDDENS, supra note 58; Pierre Bourdieu, Social Space and 
Symbolic Power, 7 SOC. THEORY 14 (1989). 
 60. See generally VAN ROOIJ, supra note 11 (detaling findings from this 
study). 
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periods61 but rather as analytical constructs that allow us to 
group and highlight important aspects.  These aspects constitute 
the evolution of community-based regulation and ultimately 
result in the formation of the compensation trap.  These sections 
are followed by a discussion of how discursive and practice 
frameworks form during these three stages and how these 
frameworks influence community-based regulation.  Finally, we 
conclude by drawing out the theoretical and practical 
implications of the Baocun findings. 
II. INDUSTRIAL COMPENSATION IN THE 
PLANNED ECONOMY 
A. When Industrialization Started 
A few decades ago, Baocun was a purely agricultural village 
located in the hills adjacent to a river in southwestern China.  
Farmers cultivated wet rice on the best land, using water 
buffaloes to plow the paddies, while other land was used to grow 
corn and vegetables.  Life was not easy; in some years villagers 
struggled to meet the state grain quota.  Industrialization arrived 
when the village’s immense phosphorus resources attracted state 
and collective investment.  A large state-owned factory, called 
Linchang, started production, and several collectively-owned 
mines began to produce the raw materials needed in the factory.  
Meanwhile, village collectives initiated enterprises to make 
products for Linchang. 
This was the time of the planned economy, when income 
originated from either the state or the collective.  
Industrialization brought state investments to the village and 
thereby increased the collective income, which no longer solely 
depended on agriculture.  The new state-owned factory required 
village land for its premises.  To compensate the village for the 
lost land, it offered to take on a set number of villagers as formal 
 
 61. A very general chronological indication sets the first stage from the early 
1980s until the late 1980s, the second stage from the mid-1980s until 
(depending which sub-village) 2004-present, followed by the last stage, which 
has only occurred in some of the sub-villages (most notably in Tazu) starting 
from about 2004. 
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employees with full benefits, including housing, insurance, and 
pensions.62  Meanwhile, the collective factories and mines also 
needed land.  Seeing as the collective enterprises did not need to 
compensate themselves for using collectively owned land, they 
acquired it in exchange for nothing. 
Industrialization brought pollution to Baocun.  Pollution 
sickened the local livestock,63 and farmers were no longer able to 
use water buffaloes (shuiniu) to plow their rice paddies.  In 
addition, the lively agricultural market that used to be organized 
in the center of Baocun ceased to be profitable.64  To compensate 
for the sickened livestock, Linchang not only offered to buy the 
buffaloes65 but also offered to incorporate market personnel into 
the factory as formal workers.66 
This was a time when villagers still wanted to become formal 
workers.  It offered a unique opportunity for upwards social 
mobility, providing income, housing, insurance, and pension 
benefits as well as the status of a worker.  Worker registration 
proved that one was no longer tied to the village but to the 
factory.67  Industrialization thus led to stratification and the 
creation of a new social stratum, the industrial worker, adding to 
the original strata of peasants and leaders.  The ties between the 
state enterprise and the village were still loose and largely 
consisted of linkages between the state and the collective 
industries, without directly affecting the incomes of local 
 
 62. Interview by Yunmei Wu, Yiyun Zhang & Anna Lora Wainwright with 
Elder Male Retired Worker, in Baocun, China (May 12, 2009) (interview 
transcript on file with author); Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with 
Elder Female Villager, in Baocun, China (May 5, 2009) (interview transcript on 
file with author). 
 63. Interview by Yunmei Wu, Yiyun Zhang & Anna Lora Wainwright with 
Elder Male Villager, in Baocun, China (May 5, 2009) (interview transcript on 
file with author). 
 64. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Elder Male Villager, in 
Baocun, China (Apr. 30, 2009) (interview transcript on file with author). 
 65. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Middle-aged Male Villager, 
in Baocun, China (May 16, 2009) (interview transcript on file with author). 
 66. Interview with Elder Male Villager, supra note 63. 
 67. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Middle-aged Female 
Village Committee Member, in Baocun, China (Apr. 24, 2009) (interview 
transcript on file with author). 
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villagers.  All of this set the first stage of community-based 
regulation in Baocun village. 
B. The First Community-Based Regulation 
At the first stage, industrialization caused damage that was 
compensated for in a very indirect manner: no calculation of the 
damage was made nor was the damage attributed to specific 
individuals.  Instead, a social package was offered by the state as 
a douceur for the adverse effects of industrialization.  The state 
thus acted as a generous benefactor, and villagers were expected 
to be happy with what they got.  In this first stage, no clear 
relation existed between compensation and damage.  
Compensation in the planned economy came from the state and 
was initiated by the state.  It did not involve much participation 
or negotiation from the village collective, let alone individual 
villagers.  As a result, no activism was needed for this type of 
compensation.  In any case, there was no context in which 
activism could be organized without direct repercussions.  It was 
still a time where the town police came into the village to arrest 
villagers reported to have voiced critical opinions against the 
state.68  The compensation package of the planned economy had 
no regulatory intentions or effects, as there was little to induce 
the factory to prevent or control any damage.  The compensation 
paid to the villagers consisted of salaries that the factory would 
have had to pay its workers anyway.  The first stage set a path 
that guided later instances of community regulation.  It has left a 
legacy of the all-powerful state that supports the industry and of 
the powerlessness of local citizens who should be happy to get 
anything for the damage incurred. 
 
 68. Interview with Elder Male Retired Worker, supra note 62. 
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III. COMPENSATION CONTRACTS AND 
COLLECTIVE ACTION 
A. The Start of Compensation for Land Loss and 
Pollution 
The second stage of community-based regulation began when 
the factory started to pay the village collective to compensate for 
pollution and loss of collective land.  It was at this stage that 
damage caused by the industry became linked to monetary 
compensation as well as the provision of certain services like 
irrigation and road construction.  It was also at this stage that 
villagers tried to organize collective action to get or improve such 
compensation. 
Monetary compensation commenced when Linchang needed 
land to store residue from the phosphorous chemical fertilizer 
production (i.e., phosphor gypsum, linshigao).  It did not acquire 
land in return for labor contracts; instead, it offered the Qingyizu 
sub-village a fixed amount of money for storing its waste on a 
designated area in their hills.  A ten-year contract between the 
factory and the sub-village was signed, under which the factory 
paid 15,000 RMB69 annually to the sub-village collective.70  In the 
neighboring sub-village of Qingerzu, where the factory also 
wanted to store part of its waste residue, a similar contract was 
signed.  It was stipulated that as long as the factory exists, it will 
provide free irrigation water in exchange for waste storage.71  
Other pollution compensation contracts followed, as industrial 
pollution became increasingly manifest: crops failed, the water 
deteriorated, and the air started to smell.  With the largest 
compensation contract, Linchang paid Tazu sub-village 66,000 
RMB annually for what was termed “agricultural compensation,” 
which actually consisted of payments for damage resulting from 
pollution.  Linchang also paid contract-based compensation to the 
 
 69. RMB stands for Ren Min Bi, China’s national currency. 
 70. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Middle-aged Male Qing 
Yizu Sub-Village Committee Representative, in Baocun, China (Apr. 27, 2009) 
(interview transcript on file with author). 
 71. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Qing Erzu Sub-village 
Leader, in Baocun, China (Apr. 28, 2009) (interview transcript on file with 
author). 
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Jiaoqingzu sub-village of around 10,000 RMB and a couple of 
thousand to the Qingyizu sub-village.72  Smaller factories and 
mines also entered into compensation agreements, often framed 
as end-of-year bonuses (guonianqian), paying 200 RMB to each 
villager involved and often paying more for elderly people.73 
Concurrently with an uptick in pollution compensation, this 
stage saw an increasing amount of money flowing into the 
collective village finance as a result of payments by industry for 
the land used for industrial premises and mines.  This change 
occurred as privatization set in, and the original collective and 
state-owned industry became mostly privately-owned.74  As a 
result, land was no longer provided without payment to the 
collective factories and mines; it was to be paid for, on the basis of 
long-term contracts.  The village collective remitted some of the 
money to the villagers, who started to get an extra 200 to 300 
RMB as end-of-year bonuses.75 
B. Negotiation and Activism for Compensation 
Citizens no longer remained passive bystanders in all of this 
and started to actively seek better compensation.  With different 
degrees of success, citizens organized themselves to support 
negotiations for pollution compensation deals or to voice that they 
were not happy with the deals made.  They organized different 
forms of action, including independent testing of water wells,76 
joint requests to village leaders, and blockades of factory 
premises, mines, or major transport routes to industrial 
 
 72. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Vice-Secretary of the 
Village Committee, in Baocun, China (Apr. 27, 2009) (interview transcript on 
file with author). 
 73. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Sub-Village Leader Qing 
Yizu, in Baocun, China (Apr. 27, 2009) (interview transcript on file with author). 
 74. See BARRY NAUGHTON, THE CHINESE ECONOMY: TRANSITIONS AND GROWTH 
121 (2007). 
 75. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Wife of Baita Sub-village 
Leader, in Baocun, China (Apr. 30, 2009) (interview transcript on file with 
author). 
 76. Interview with Elder Male Retired Worker, supra note 62. 
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complexes.  Villagers in Tazu sub-village were particularly active; 
they have a local reputation for ferocity and solidarity.77 
At first an attempt was made to involve the town authorities.  
Village leaders organized villagers to write a joint petition to the 
town government complaining about Linchang’s pollution.  The 
attempted petition failed, however, and the town authorities 
declined to consider their grievances.  Villagers recall that 
Linchang sent two cars with what they think were gifts to the 
village leaders, who later no longer pursued the petition.78 
In another incident, in Tazu, Linchang’s discharge pipes were 
somehow connected to the village irrigation canals, and the acidic 
wastewater killed crops.  Meanwhile, villagers noted that there 
was a high incidence of gallstones.  The villagers went to the 
factory and demanded that it provide the same clean water as the 
factory itself used, and arrange free health check-ups.  The 
factory agreed to give them the water but refused to give them 
check-ups.79 
Following another spillage that killed crops and resulted in 
more complaints that they did not feel well (bushufu), villagers 
went to the factory to protest (qu nao).80  After the factory had 
investigated the matter, it agreed to pay a fee based on the 
amount of land that was involved.81  From this moment onwards, 
the sub-village started to receive an annual fixed compensation 
fee of 66,000 RMB.82  Here again, villagers had demanded health 
check-ups, a demand which the factory ignored.  As one villager 
recalls, “[The factory] did not dare, and even if check-ups had 
turned up diseases, they would not have told [the villagers].”83 
 
 77. Interview by Yunmei Wu, Yiyun Zhang & Anna Lora Wainwright with 
Niece of Village Leader, in Baocun, China (May 4, 2009) (interview transcript on 
file with author). 
 78. Interview by Yunmei Wu, Yiyun Zhang & Anna Lora Wainwright with 
Middle-aged Female Rice Noodle Seller, in Baocun, China (May 11, 2009) 
(interview transcript on file with author). 
 79. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Niece of Village Leader, in 
Baocun, China (May 14, 2009) (interview transcript on file with author). 
 80. Interview with Middle-aged Female Rice Noodle Seller, supra note 78. 
 81. Interview with Elder Retired Worker, supra note 62. 
 82. Interview with Middle-aged Female Rice Noodle Seller, supra note 78; 
Interview with Elder Retired Worker, supra note 62. 
 83. Interview with Middle-aged Female Rice Noodle Seller, supra note 78. 
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An explosion in the sulphuric acid (liusuan) plant several 
years later, which again had major effects on local crops and fish, 
sparked another round of activism.  The village leaders and the 
factory had originally reached a deal after the factory itself sent 
its environmental protection division to investigate.  The deal 
meant that the factory would pay for the damage, the annual 
compensation payment would be raised to 100,000 RMB, and the 
payment be raised again every three years.84  Villagers were not 
happy with the deal as they considered the compensation too low.  
In addition, they discovered that village leaders received more 
than others.  In response, half of Tazu sub-village went to the 
factory in protest, some bringing dead fish from their polluted 
fish ponds.85  This time, factory representatives responded that 
they would not talk with villagers, only with their formal 
representatives.  To no avail, villagers responded: “Who says so? 
The masses (qunzhong) are representatives, the masses are 
community members, the masses are also leaders (guan).”86  In 
the end their pleas fell on deaf ears as the factory continued to 
refuse to negotiate with them.  Finally, the village leaders 
convinced them to leave and let them talk with the factory.87  At 
the time, the local media was barred from reporting the accident 
on orders of the local government.88 
C. The Role of Local Leaders 
Village leaders have played an important, albeit contested 
role, in the formation and execution of these contracts as well as 
in the organization of collective action.  They were active in the 
negotiations for the compensation.  They were stimulated to do so 
by the industry, which excluded all but the village leaders from 
the negotiations.  Village leaders were thereby placed in an 
intermediary position between the villagers and the factories.  
This position presented an opportunity for private gain, as the 
 
 84. Interview with Niece of Village Leader, supra note 62. 
 85. Interview with Middle-aged Male Villager, supra note 65. 
 86. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Elderly Female Villager, in 
Baocun, China (May 15, 2009) (interview transcript on file with author). 
 87. Interview with Niece of Village Leader, supra note 79. 
 88. Interview with Middle-aged Male Villager, supra note 65. 
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factory has provided preferential benefits to village leaders, 
especially following bouts of local collective action.89  Not only 
were they offered better compensation for their land, they were 
also rumored to have taken part of the collective compensation 
package offered to the village.  In Qingyizu, for instance, a deal 
was reached in which the factory would pay the sub-village 
150,000 RMB over a period of ten years; after five years, villagers 
found out that the money paid over that period, 75,000 RMB, was 
missing.90  Leaders were also suspected of keeping most of the 
income made through land deals and only relaying part of the 
money to villagers via the end-of-year bonus system.  Village 
leaders could also benefit from their monopoly control by 
providing non-local labor to the local factories.  They could do so 
when Linchang started to hire temporary laborers, who were not 
offered a full contract with all benefits and worker status.  At 
first, these workers were largely drawn from the local 
countryside, but gradually, the factory preferred to hire non-local 
laborers, especially for the heavy work which locals increasingly 
did not like to do.  Linchang let the Baocun village leaders 
establish a labor agency that has had the exclusive authority to 
arrange for such temporary labor contracts and has allowed the 
leaders to make a hefty profit. 91 
All of this affected the role that leaders played at this stage of 
collective action.  On the one hand, interviewees pointed out that 
this generation of leaders was more willing to support collective 
action, as their corruption meant they could benefit directly, with 
less of the money going to the villagers.92  On the other hand, 
interviewees stressed that the older leaders suppressed collective 
 
 89. Interview with Niece of Village Leader, supra note 79. 
 90. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Middle-aged Male Villager, 
in Baocun, China (July 7, 2009) (interview transcript on file with author). 
 91. Interview with Middle-aged Female Villager, supra note 62; Interview by 
Yunmei Wu, Yiyun Zhang & Anna Lora Wainwright with Middle-aged Male 
Migrant Worker, in Baocun, China (May 10, 2009) (interview transcript on file 
with author); Interview by Yunmei Wu, Yiyun Zhang & Anna Lora Wainwright 
with Middle-aged Male Villager, in Baocun, China (May 11, 2009) (interview 
transcript on file with author); Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with 
Middle-aged Male Villager, in Baocun, China (May 3, 2009) (interview 
transcript on file with author). 
 92. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Niece of Village Leader, in 
Baocun, China (May 15, 2009) (interview transcript on file with author). 
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action, scolding those who wanted to protest and telling villagers 
that only the leaders should talk with the factory.93  This dual 
perception is best understood by their dual role.  They could 
benefit from deals made with the factories and thus would 
condone some amount of pressure to arrange these deals.  At the 
same time, they would not benefit if protests got out of hand and 
upset higher levels of government or the industry they were so 
indebted to. 
Here we see that the factories were not neutral.  By co-opting 
local leaders and strengthening their bargaining position in 
pollution, land, and labor agreements, they tied villagers to 
leaders who were more likely to serve their own financial 
interests rather than local public interests.  The factories have 
carefully responded to pollution-related demands, paying 
relatively small amounts for material damage while consistently 
refusing to give in to potentially more difficult demands related to 
health, such as medical check-ups. 
D. The Role of Governmental Regulators 
In all of this, the role of the State as pollution regulator 
remained limited.  Although the Chinese state started to regulate 
pollution in earnest by the mid-1990s,94 it seems to have had 
little effect on industrial pollution.  After the state EPBs started 
regular on-site inspections, they failed for years to uncover that 
local factories were secretly and illegally discharging and 
emitting pollution at night by switching off their environmental 
installations.  In one case, the provincial EPB even sent a team of 
inspectors to live on-site for a period, after which an 
environmental responsibility contract was signed between the 
factory and the EPB detailing an internal responsibility system 
involving top-to-bottom management for pollution control 
 
 93. Interview with Elder Male Retired Worker, supra note 62; Interview with 
Niece of Village Leader, supra note 79. 
 94. See generally MA & ORTOLANO, supra note 12; BARBARA J. SINKULE & 
LEONARD ORTOLANO, IMPLEMENTING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN CHINA (1995); 
Benjamin van Rooij, Implementing Chinese Environmental Law through 
Enforcement, in THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA (J. Chen et al. eds., 2002); VAN ROOIJ, supra note 11. 
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results.95  For a long time Linchang was listed as a compliant 
factory.96  Inspection agents seem to have been unable to detect 
the local problems, as inspections were too few and too limited to 
detect that anything unusual was happening.  Since the state 
failed to successfully engage local villagers, villagers kept a 
distance from the state such that the environmental authorities 
had difficulty ascertaining the pollution issues that were so well-
known by the locals.97 
The second stage of community-based regulation was thus 
one of compensation contracts and collective action.  
Compensation contracts regularized land and pollution claims.  
While they generally linked damage to compensation, they did so 
for a longer term and at the village level, making it difficult for 
individual villagers to know how the compensation they were 
finally paid was related to the damage incurred.  Citizens started 
to play a role, albeit one that was set and staged within a tight 
framework.  Their role was to highlight and support claims, 
which were then negotiated in a closed setting involving village 
and enterprise “leaders” (dangguande).  Only leaders decided how 
much money was to be paid and its distribution. Citizen-based 
activism was confined within set boundaries.  The boundaries 
were perceived through experience, as villagers learned what 
action would lead to compensation, what action was seriously 
checked, and what would be ignored.98  Failure to involve outside 
support in the proposed petition was followed by a period in 
which no further attempts were made.  Activism, as villagers 
knew and their leaders stressed, should not attract too much 
attention from the higher levels and cause trouble.  Villagers 
largely took what was offered, even though what they got was not 
based on the actual damage that had occurred (i.e., loss of land or 
pollution).  Despite increasing solidarity, the second stage still 
had a sense of orientation around sub-villages.  This was 
definitely the case in Tacun, the activist sub-village, where 
villagers strove to increase their joint income even though they 
knew their leaders were pocketing a substantial amount of it. 
 
 95. Interview with Middle-aged Male Migrant Worker, supra note 91. 
 96. See VAN ROOIJ, supra note 11, at 198. 
 97. See id. at chs. 13-14. 
 98. See Lora-Wainwright et al., supra note 49. 
23
  
724 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  29 
 
E. Compensation Legitimizing and Normalizing 
Pollution 
In the second stage, compensation seems to have had a 
legitimizing instead of a regulatory effect, as payment bought a 
license to pollute.  In community claims, villagers did not make 
value judgments about pollution, refraining from normative 
claims about the unjust, illegal or immoral nature of pollution. 
Claims were about redress; they were about payment for damage 
or finding out about damage.  They were not about ending, 
controlling, or decreasing pollution.  Claims paid seemed not to 
have had much, if any, deterrent effect, simply because the 
amounts remained very low in comparison with the costs of 
abatement.  Here, the riches of the factories stand in stark 
contrast to the poverty of the villagers, for whom a small amount 
of compensation was a welcome addition to their income.  
Furthermore, villagers were not free to accept or decline 
compensation offers like the co-opted village leaders, whose 
interests were aligned with the industry dominated negotiations.  
Thus, redress started to preclude regulation. 
The legacy of the second stage has been two-fold. First, 
contractual compensation has rationalized pollution and made it 
routine, setting the compensation tightly in a frame of redress 
and not pollution regulation.  Second, collective action is clearly 
set within this frame as well as within the larger frame of 
growing stratification and increasing interdependencies (among 
the village, its leadership, the industrial complex and the state), 
keeping activism focused on material redress and away from 
state involvement or other outside forms of support. 
IV. RESOURCE CAPITALISM AND OPPORTUNIST 
ACQUIESCENCE 
A. Deepening Interdependencies 
At the third stage of community-based regulation, 
compensation derived from the industrial complex (whether for 
land usage or pollution) becomes an important source of 
individual income.  This deepens the interdependencies between 
villagers, their leaders, and the industrial complex, creating a 
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setting in which local activism is strongly directed towards 
redress instead of regulation.  It also deepens stratification by 
dividing pollution victims and undermining the solidarity 
necessary for consorted action.  The activism that continues 
during this period has opportunist characteristics and is limited 
through leadership control and community acquiescence. 
While villagers depended largely on work for income until the 
third stage, whether through agricultural or industrial labor, 
land use compensation began to make up a large part of the local 
income.  This started when new leaders were elected in 2004.  
These new leaders broke with the old tradition of splitting only a 
small portion of collective income amongst villagers, instead 
initiating a fenhong (division of the red) system.  Through this 
system, Tazu villagers received a per-capita annual income of 
8000 RMB in 2009 and 15,000 RMB in 2008,99 when a large 
amount of land usage compensation was paid by a local mine.100  
This resource-based, work-free income paid more than most 
villagers made working in fields or factories.  The new leaders 
also broke with the old policy severely restricting housing 
development.  Farmers have thereby started to earn extra income 
renting out rooms in newly built houses to the many migrants 
that have by now come to work in Baocun101 (about sixty to 
eighty per room per month, with one household for instance 
renting fourteen rooms102).  Such land-related income has now 
become so important that there is much concern when outsiders 
marry into the village, especially with respect to divorce, as many 
believe they should also abandon their local Tazu registration 
(hukou) and related fenhong entitlements.103  People even pay 
considerable sums of money to retain or get a Tazu registration, 
willingly paying up to 10,000 RMB, seeing it as a good 
 
 99. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Middle-aged Female 
Villager, in Baocun, China (May 19, 2009) (interview transcript on file with 
author); Interview with Niece of Village Leader, supra note 77; Interview with 
Middle-aged Female Rice Noodle Seller, supra note 78. 
 100. Interview with Middle-aged Female Villager, supra note 62. 
 101. Interview with Middle-aged Male Qing Yizu Sub-village Committee 
Representative, supra note 70. 
 102. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Female Local Doctor, in 
Baocun, China (May 3, 2009) (interview transcript on file with author). 
 103. Interview with Wife of Baita Sub-village Leader, supra note 75. 
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investment.  Life in Tazu village has changed; many people now 
depend on this resource-based income and have more time for 
leisure.  As a result, the sub-village now boasts an extraordinary 
amount of majiang halls,104 where the locals spend their days 
playing and gambling.105  Sub-village leaders have used the 
money to organize popular holidays for villagers to 
Xishuanbanna, Shanghai, and Beijing.106 
The third stage, as it is presently unfolding, shows a 
deepening of the stratification initiated by the process of 
industrialization.  It seems that the original industrial 
stratification has reversed: while in the collective days formal 
worker status was the most desired position, now, at least in 
Tazu, villager status has become more desirable because of land-
related income.  As one villager stated, “In the past, workers’ 
lives were better than farmers’, now farmers do better than 
workers.”107  Additionally, there are now clear differences 
between the resource-capitalist villagers of Tazu, who get a 
significant portion of their income from the rent derived from 
land compensation and housing, and the villagers from other sub-
villages who only receive a small amount of such income, too little 
to stop or even reduce working.  Furthermore, migrants have 
become a dominant stratum in Baocun; there are now more 
migrants living there than native villagers.  The migrants have a 
special status, with only limited citizenship in the village.  They 
can rent housing, work in local factories and fields, and arrange 
schooling for their children; however, they do not get to 
 
 104. More than ten public ones and many private ones at home. Interview by 
Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Female Local Market Salesperson, in Baocun, 
China (May 20, 2009) (interview transcript on file with author). 
 105. Interview with Middle-aged Male Migrant Worker, supra note 91; 
Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang, with Middle-aged Male Owner of 
Majiang Hall, in Baocun, China (May 16, 2009) (interview transcript on file with 
author); Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang, with Middle-aged Male Local 
Mine Worker, in Baocun, China (May 16, 2009) (interview transcript on file with 
author). 
 106. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang, with Female Accountant of 
Sub-village, in Baocun, China (Apr. 24, 2009) (interview transcript on file with 
author). 
 107. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang, with Middle-aged Female 
Villager, in Baocun, China (Apr. 26, 2009) (interview transcript on file with 
author). 
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participate in the local elections, nor can they share in the 
collective resources that have become a more important part of 
village income.  Their limited village citizenship also excludes 
them from income-derived pollution compensation contracts, 
which are based on land to which they have no formal 
entitlement. 
As Tazu villagers now receive an important source of income 
from revenue derived from the industrial complex, they are tied 
to the local industries more strongly than ever.  While in the past 
their income was largely agricultural, and thus independent of 
industry, few presently engage in agriculture.  Pollution has 
made agriculture difficult, and land-related income has made it 
unattractive, hard work with little pay.  Villagers let migrants 
cultivate the land, as they do not want it to lie idle and get 
covered in long grass (changcao).  One villager explained that 
would mean that they would lose entitlement to pollution-related 
compensation.  Local villagers also derive income from the 
industrial complex as factory workers and as transporters with 
small private transport companies.  The industrial complex has 
enabled the development of a service sector, with many food and 
leisure haunts catering to the land-lucky villagers of Tazu.  The 
migrants attracted by the industrial complex provide further 
income to villagers. As one migrant explained, “Of every five 
chickens sold in the local market, four are bought by migrants.”  
The intermediary position of local leaders, between villagers and 
the industrial complex, has only strengthened in the third phase, 
given that the village leaders have arranged the land-related 
revenue.  They have therefore gained local legitimacy and voter 
support for future elections, while also maintaining favorable ties 
with the local industry through the continued and increasingly 
lucrative control of the labor company.  Villagers in Tazu thus 
depend more on their leaders than ever before, seeing as they are 
now responsible for a large share of their income. 
B. Continued Pollution and Increasing Awareness 
As described above, the third stage reflects an intricate web 
of interdependencies between local villagers, migrants, industrial 
enterprises and mines, and village leaders.  Meanwhile, pollution 
continues, both regular and incidental.  Although there have been 
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some improvements, given the pollution abatement investments 
made by Linchang, villagers still report many pollution-related 
problems.  They informed us that they are still unable to grow 
certain crops or keep certain livestock.  They are very careful 
about using water from local wells, fearing that it is polluted or 
even poisonous.  They ascribe certain health-related problems to 
pollution, which some call strange diseases (guaibing).  These 
include nose infections and nose bleeds, rheumatism and sore 
joints, headaches, memory loss, bad teeth and weak bones (which 
they fear comes from fluorosis), issues related to reproductive 
organs, and even a higher incidence of certain kinds of cancer 
according to some villagers.  Some said that for years now, their 
youngsters have been unable to pass army medical tests.  
Villagers also complained of a bad smell at night, which the 
research team likewise noted.  Some call this smell “poison gas” 
and explain that it is emitted at night by Linchang.  They also 
related that the enterprises use the cover of night to discharge 
polluted water from the phosphorus mineral cleaning process.  
There have also been several accidents at Linchang and the other 
factories.  The worst occurred in 2008 when a sulfuric acid depot 
exploded at Linchang, killing five and leaving twenty-two 
wounded.  While citizens are clearly aware of the problems 
pollution causes, our interviews also showed a habituation.  
Villagers told us that you get used to the smell and that you can 
adapt to pollution by planting different crops, closing your 
window, or drinking bottled mineral water.108  As one villager 
explained: “Pollution? We all get pollution.  And if the pollution is 
really bad, and you cannot grow anything on your land, then don’t 
grow anything, let it lie idle and buy some food.”109 
 
 108. Interview with Female Local Market Salesperson, supra note 104, 
Interview by Yunmei Wu, Yiyun Zhang & Anna Lora Wainwright with Elder 
Female Villager, in Baocun, China (May 4, 2009) (interview transcript on file 
with author), Interview with Elder Male Retired Worker, supra note 62;  
Interview by Yunmei Wu, Yiyun Zhang & Anna Lora Wainwright with Middle 
Aged Male Villager, in Baocun, China (May 3, 2009) (interview transcript on file 
with author). 
 109. Interview by Yunmei Wu, Yiyun Zhang & Anna Lora Wainwright with 
Middle-aged Male Worker, in Baocun, China (May 13, 2009) (interview 
transcript on file with author). 
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At this stage, compensation contracts continue and are 
largely based on agreements made in the second stage.  The 
largest contract between Linchang and Tazu is renegotiated 
based on the earlier terms that compensation will be raised once 
every three years.  At the beginning of the next term, it is 
expected that the factory will pay Tazu an annual compensation 
of 150,000 RMB, a 20,000 RMB increase from the 130,000 RMB 
paid in 2009.  The contracts seem at this stage to have become a 
set affair, as they are based on agreements made in the past and 
form a regular additional source of income for villagers.  One 
difference with the past is that leaders now seem to perform 
better in distributing the income from these contracts to the 
relevant villagers involved, rather than keeping part of the 
compensation for themselves as in the past. 
C. Reduced Activism and Solidarity 
Collective action continues, largely organized in reaction to 
incidents and not against regular pollution and nightly 
discharges.  There have been several blockades organized by 
groups of villagers.  For instance, there was a chlorine leak at 
Linchang that caused a terrible and bad-smelling smoke.  
Villagers recall that they had trouble breathing because of the 
smoke and feared for their health.110  In response, villagers 
organized a blockade when their village leaders remained 
unresponsive to their grievances.  The blockade attracted the 
attention of the local government (at the town level), which came 
to deal with the matter.  As a result, the factory deputy director 
came to Tazu to talk with the villagers.  Tazu people expressed 
that they wanted the same drinking water that the factory used 
and also demanded health check-ups.  As in the past, the factory 
agreed to give them water but refused the health check-ups, 
offering 100 RMB per person instead.111  As one villager analyzed 
it, “Perhaps they were afraid that the tests would reveal illnesses, 
causing them trouble.  That is why they had this attitude of 
 
 110. Interview with Middle-aged Male Villager, supra note 65. 
 111. Id. 
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tricking us (qipian de taidu), they were just fooling the people 
(suisuibianbian de jiu hunongle laobaixing).”112 
Another example of activism followed a major explosion of a 
sulfuric acid depot at Linchang, killing five workers and 
wounding twenty-two, and breaking many windows in the Tazu 
sub-village.  The morning after, villagers flocked to the factory 
demanding compensation for relocation.  Villagers told us how 
this incident awakened their anxieties about the safety hazard 
that the factory presents: “We all know here that there is a large 
ammonia pipeline there, and if that explodes, well that is scary.”  
I have heard others say: “If the ammonia pipe explodes, you can 
only survive if you slit your throat to prevent the air from going 
into your body.”113  In response to their worries about their safety 
and the demands they made to be relocated, the factory allegedly 
stated: “You can get a medical check-up, if it shows that there are 
problems and you have evidence of the problems, let us talk 
again.”114  Thus, the factory reframed the villagers’ original 
demands and worries into a framework of compensation, where 
redress based on evidence counts rather than prevention of 
pollution or hazards.  Meanwhile, local leaders urged the 
villagers to drop their demands and action, claiming that this is a 
difficult time for the factory and that it will all be solved in due 
course.  Leaders allegedly stated, “If you take action in this way it 
will put oil on the fire, it is not good.”115  Recalling this incident, 
one villager stated, “I asked why is it not good? I fear that there 
are connections (guanxi) between the leaders (dangguande) of the 
factory and the village.  Of course I thought so.”116  Again the 
village leaders told the villagers that they would arrange the 
compensation.  The strong language in which all of this was said 
seems to have had the effect that the villagers abandoned their 
action.  As far as we know, they did not even talk to the many 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Interview by Jianyuan Wang, Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang, with Middle-
aged Female Villager, in Baocun, China (Apr. 24, 2009) (interview transcript on 
file with author). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Middle-aged Female 
Village Committee Member, in Baocun, China (May 16, 2009) (interview 
transcript on file with author). 
 116. Id. 
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journalists or state officials who had come down to the village 
following the accident.  Villagers did not take action again in 
relation to the explosion, although some ultimately received an 
incidental compensation of 200 RMB.117 
Although these incidents show that collective action 
continues in the third stage, villagers have indicated that there is 
less activism nowadays than in the past.118  There is less 
solidarity, one local activist explained, as people have become 
richer.  The dependency on land-related revenues has likely had a 
dampening effect on activism.  With free money coming in from 
land deals and citizens less engaged in agriculture, pollution has 
a less direct effect on their income, while the benefits of activism 
(getting pollution compensation fees of several hundred RMB) are 
relatively less attractive to citizens.  Land and pollution-related 
compensation is divided and paid on an individual basis, while 
money derived from activism has in certain instances gone to the 
activists involved rather than to the whole community.  
Meanwhile, villagers also see their village leaders putting their 
personal interests above the community.  All of this has 
influenced a culture of opportunism where solidarity is a thing of 
the past.  As one villager elaborated, “People do not care for 
problems that are not their own.  This is our biggest problem.”119  
Activism has thus become wrought with opportunism.  Mrs. Wu, 
a leading activist involved in many of the Tazu actions, freely 
admitted that she is “in it” for the money and public office, hoping 
that her role in the action will get her elected into village 
leadership. 
The lack of solidarity exists at a deeper level than seen by 
most villagers.  Because of stratification and its results on village 
citizenship and related entitlements, the interests of the people 
suffering from pollution are not aligned.  First of all, the interests 
of different sub-villages are divided.  As land and pollution-
related compensation deals are established at the sub-village 
level, some sub-villages, such as Tazu, have been able to get much 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Niece of Village Leader 
and Male Owner of Majiang Hall, in Baocun, China (May 16, 2009) (interview 
transcript on file with author). 
 119. Id. 
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more than others.  The differential treatment of pollution victims 
in different sub-villages has prevented victims from joining hands 
in a consorted effort.  Another especially significant gap exists 
between the interests of migrant workers and formal villagers.  
Villagers are able to benefit from land and pollution-related 
compensation packages and are therefore interested in activism 
at certain times to support compensation deals.  In contrast, 
migrants do not share in the riches created by land and pollution 
deals, although the damage they suffer from pollution is similar, 
if not worse, because of their living and working conditions.  In 
addition, migrants, like all workers at the factory, fear 
repercussions should they join collective action.  As one worker 
put it, “Families with members working at the factory could not 
protest (qunao).  Otherwise, this could affect the family salaries.  
That is why I dared not go.”120 
D. The Role of Town and Village Leaders 
Village leaders play a vital role in the third stage.  They are 
responsible for the new land-related revenues, which have 
transformed the social and economic life in parts of Baocun 
village.  Because of this, they enjoy an unprecedented amount of 
local legitimacy.  Many people support their political agenda of 
change and transparency even though they question their 
corruption and strong-willed character.  The new leaders have 
sprung from the industrial stratification that has occurred, with 
most of them having come to power after earning riches in the 
Baocun industrial complex.  The new leaders are thus born from 
the industrial entrepreneurs and have much closer ties with 
industry than the former generation.  The village leaders, 
because of the importance of the land-related revenue, have an 
even stronger intermediary role between the industrial complex 
and the villagers, than the former generation.  All of this has 
shaped their influence on collective action.  In many of the cases 
of collective action, the village leaders had a restricting role, both 
at the Village Committee (VC) and the sub-village level.  They 
urged villagers to let them negotiate with the factories.  Since the 
factories largely excluded villagers from the negotiations, they 
 
 120. Interview with Middle-aged Male Villager, supra note 65. 
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were empowered to do so by the polluting factories involved.  In 
several instances, the village leaders dispersed protests, using 
strong language and threats, with people obeying their 
charismatic commands out of fear.121  Sometimes they did so on 
instructions of the town government, which wanted an end to the 
local unrest in its jurisdiction.122  And, at least in the perception 
of some villagers, village leaders as well as township government 
leaders wanted to protect the important industrial tax base.123  
Villagers retain a mixed view of the role of village leaders in 
pollution issues.  On the one hand, some claim that without 
village leadership support, protesting is useless.124  On the other 
hand, they protest in response to the lack of support from local 
leaders and find that unless they protest, they will not get the 
attention of their leaders or the factories involved.125 
E. Lack of Trust in State Regulators 
In the third stage, state regulation has become stricter.  In 
2004, the municipal EPB finally took action against the ongoing 
pollution in the village when it found evidence of secret nightly 
discharges during an intensive inspection period organized in a 
national environmental law enforcement campaign.126  In 
response, it fined the Linchang company and threatened to make 
the fine public.  It used this threat to make a deal with Linchang 
to stop outsourcing its most polluting chemical production to 
small, heavily polluting enterprises located twenty kilometers 
further downstream and which had been made the prime target 
of this particular enforcement campaign.  While this may have 
had some effect on these small factories, effects in Baocun 
remained limited because the company continued secret nightly 
discharges while slowly investing in abatement equipment, 
 
 121. Interview with Middle-aged Female Villager, supra note 99. 
 122. Interview with Middle-aged Male Villager, supra note 65. 
 123. Id.; Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Elder Female Villager, 
in Baocun, China (May 17, 2009) (interview transcript on file with author). 
 124. Interview with Middle-aged Female Villager, supra note 99; Interview by 
Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Niece of Village Leader, in Baocun, China 
(May 20, 2009) (interview transcript on file with author). 
 125. Interview with Middle-aged Male Villager, supra note 65. 
 126. See VAN ROOIJ, supra note 11, at 154. 
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thereby flaunting state regulatory oversight.  A few years later, 
Baocun attracted the attention of the national environmental 
regulator (then called SEPA), which placed one of its new 
expansion projects on a list of the twenty riskiest projects in 
China.  Meanwhile, the local environmental authorities at the 
municipal level continued to regulate the company, organizing 
regular daytime inspections and reviewing environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) reports for new production lines at the factory.  
These reports continued to be approved, and there was a 
seemingly standard section in all of them detailing the local 
public view of the factory and the project.  These sections were all 
positive, with the citizens allegedly expressing that the factory 
was doing well and the intended new production was good.  It is 
not clear how these sections were prepared or whether citizens 
were actually interviewed, and if so, which citizens, leaders or 
ordinary villagers.  What is clear is that these reports do not 
represent the many voices we have heard detailing pollution-
related economic and health damage as well as local concerns 
about safety.  The state regulator seems to have been unable to 
get in touch with local opinion.  This can partly be explained by 
some of the local views of the environmental authorities.  Few 
citizens mentioned the EPBs.  The ones that did stressed their 
strictness, explaining that if they would come to the village and 
deal with the factories, their action would be strict.127  The 
development and compensation frameworks seem to have 
influenced their views on such stern action.  Since there is no 
belief in pollution reduction and there is a continued hope of 
compensation derived income, action that punishes pollution and 
perhaps reduces it is likely not welcome.  Reduced pollution is 
framed together with reduced development.128  On the other 
hand, we heard an opportunist view that regulation would divert 
compensation fees paid to the village towards fines paid to the 
state.129  As Tazu leader Li said, “If the EPB comes to fine 
Linchang and takes their money, is it not better that this stays 
 
 127. Interview with Middle-aged Female Villager, supra note 62; Interview 
with Elder Male Retired Worker, supra note 62. 
 128. Interview with Female Local Market Salesperson, supra note 104. 
 129. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Baita Sub-village Leader, 
in Baocun, China (May 21, 2009) (interview transcript on file with author). 
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here and villagers can get it?”130  Meanwhile, prior experience 
with a local protectionist state, combined with the pessimist 
frame, may make villagers doubtful of what environmental 
authorities can do on the local level.  One villager thought that if 
local leaders were less aligned with the factories, it would be 
possible for the environmental authorities to come and deal with 
the pollution.131  Thus, it is not surprising to hear that when 
state authorities came to the village following the explosion, 
villagers refrained from using this opportunity to draw attention 
to the pollution-related damage and their health and safety 
concerns. 
The third stage is one where community-based regulation 
fails to positively interact with state regulation.  Here, the 
interests of the state regulators and the local communities seem 
to be far apart.  By this stage, compensation and redress have 
become an end in and of themselves, instead of a means.  Even 
though villagers know about the problems related to pollution 
and worry about their health and safety, they do not translate 
these concerns into effective action that would help reduce and 
control such problems.  An explanation for this attitude comes 
from the combined legacies of the first and second stages, which 
set out a controlled path for redress instead of regulation.  The 
third stage adds to this backdrop a community that is further 
divided, where pollution has become habitual and softened by 
new riches, new income has empowered a village leadership that 
is strongly aligned with industrial interests, and an increasingly 
active state regulator has failed to involve the local community.  
A further explanation for why Baocun citizens have refrained 
from taking steps to control and regulate such pollution is more 
subtle and must be sought in the discursive frameworks that 
have developed during the three stages.132 
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 131. Interview with Middle-aged Female Villager, supra note 62. 
 132. See Lora-Wainwright et al., supra note 49. 
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V. COMMUNITY-BASED REGULATION AS A 
MATTER OF FRAMING 
A. The Role of Discursive Frameworks 
By the third stage, community-based regulation is strongly 
influenced by discursive frameworks that have evolved over the 
years and which shape how villagers perceive pollution and 
related courses of action.  In the many conversations we had with 
villagers, we found that in their analysis of pollution, health, and 
development as well as the possibility for action against 
pollution-related damage, villagers used certain discursive 
frameworks.  These frameworks have evolved gradually and are 
shaped by past experiences with the industrial complex, local and 
state leaders, and the growing interdependencies between 
themselves and industry.  We have discerned three frameworks: 
the development frame, the pessimist frame, and the 
compensation frame.  Together, these frames have internalized 
the experiences of pollution and activism, shaping the way 
villagers view pollution and possible courses of action against it. 
B. The Development Frame 
The development frame, as we call it, is a discursive 
framework that links industrial pollution to development, 
creating the notion that you cannot have one without the other, 
and that in order to get richer, pollution is inevitable.  We saw 
this frame in many of the conversations we had, not only with 
villagers but also with the village leaders and the township cadre.  
Consider the following quotes. Vice Township Secretary Li stated, 
“Pollution is a necessary price of the stage of industrial 
development.  Only if we develop first can we discuss 
environmental protection later.”133  Similarly, Village Leader Wu 
commented, “If there is no pollution, where will development 
 
 133. Interview by Yunmei Wu, Yiyun Zhang & Jianyuan Wang with Vice 
Township Secretary, in Baocun, China (Apr. 21, 2009) (interview transcript on 
file with author). 
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come from?”134  His subordinate, Tacun, sub-village chief Li, 
stated similarly: Tacun village head for instance told us pollution 
is a necessary part of development.  Villagers expressed similar 
views.  As one villager stated, “The environment is better now but 
it will get worse again, the hills have all been sold, the water is 
polluted, the air cannot get better either unless Linchang factory 
closes.  But then there will be no work, no chance to earn 
money.”135  Similarly, a villager said in one interview, “Tazu is a 
good place, only because we have the Linchang factory here . . . 
To have this factory brings good and bad.”136  Many people 
repeated that development brings both good (income) and bad 
(pollution and related damage and even diseases).  One even went 
so far as stating, “without disease there is not such good economic 
development.”137  It seems that with the increasing income 
derived from the industrial complex, a discursive framework has 
developed to deal with the negative effects of the local industry.  
This framework helps villagers, and their leaders, to rationalize 
and even accept pollution as an inevitable by-product of 
development.  It provides an unnecessarily dichotomized view of 
industrial production; it either exists and causes pollution or it 
does not exist and there is no development or pollution.  This 
view was clearly expressed by one villager, responding to whether 
the air quality could be improved: “Impossible, it cannot.  It only 
could if Linchang collapsed (kuadiao), but then there would be no 
more work and no more money.  If the air would be clean again, it 
would be hard for us to make money.”138  The reality is more 
subtle and positive, however, as factories can decrease their 
pollution if regulatory controls are effective.  The development 
frame makes pollution inevitable and thus precludes claims to 
 
 134. Interview by Yunmei Wu, Yiyun Zhang & Jianyuan Wang with Village 
Leader, in Baocun, China (Apr. 24, 2009) (interview transcript on file with 
author). 
 135. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Middle Aged Female 
Villager, in Baocun, China (19 May, 2009) (interview transcript on file with 
author). 
 136. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Elder Male Owner of 
Majiang Hall, in Baocun, China (May 18, 2009) (interview transcript on file with 
author). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Interview with Middle-aged Female Villager, supra note 99. 
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decrease or control pollution.  As such, it fits nicely with the 
compensation- and redress-oriented forms of community-based 
regulation that have developed. 
C. The Pessimist Frame 
The pessimist frame has arisen from a cocktail of pessimism 
and passivism about what can be done about pollution.  Many of 
the responses to our questions on what to do about the pollution-
related grievances were framed in terms of the impossible rather 
than the possible.  People used terms like meibanfa (it is 
impossible),139 pointing at the strength of the companies and 
their own weakness.  As one villager stated, “We can only live 
with it (zhi neng aizhe), how can we small folk (xiao laobaixing) 
overcome a big enterprise like Linchang, especially now that the 
state strongly supports industrial development?”140  Another 
said, “Taking action is useless. This is a large state-owned 
company, and the township government will protect it for the tax 
income it pays, and will not let the people protest.”141  As one 
other put it, “What can we do about it?  Nobody asks you to live in 
this village.”142  We also noted that many interviewees responded 
to our question – asking what can be done – by stating that one 
can “get a little compensation.”143  None expressed that pollution 
 
 139. Interview with Middle-aged Female Villager, supra note 62; Interview 
with Elder Male Retired Worker, supra note 62; Interview with Middle-aged 
Male Worker, supra note 109; Interview with Niece of Village Leader and Male 
Owner of Majiang Hall, supra note 118; Interview with Female Local Market 
Salesperson, supra note 104. 
 140. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Accountant of Baita Sub-
village, in Baocun, China (Apr. 29, 2009) (interview transcript on file with 
author). 
 141. Interview with Niece of Village Leader and Male Owner of Majiang Hall, 
supra note 118. 
 142. Interview with Female Local Market Salesperson, supra note 104. 
 143. See e.g., Interview by Yunmei Wu, Yiyun Zhang, and Anna Lora 
Wainwright, with Middle Aged Male Villager in Baocun, China (May 3, 2009) 
(interview transcript on file with author); Interview by Yunmei Wu and Yiyun 
Zhang with Middle Aged Male Villager in Baocun, China (Apr. 25, 2009) 
(interview transcript on file with author); Interview by Yunmei Wu, Yiyun 
Zhang, and Anna Lora Wainwright, with Niece of Village Leader in Baocun, 
China (May 4, 2009) (interview transcript on file with author); Interview by 
Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang, with Tacun subvillage chief Li, in Baocun, China 
(Apr. 29, 2009) (interview transcript on file with author).  The Tacun village 
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could be addressed or that action could be taken to control it and 
prevent damage from occurring.  This pessimism is combined 
with a sense of a lack of responsibility; many answered our 
questions about who should solve pollution-related problems by 
referring to the leaders (dangguande), which can mean those in 
the village, the factory, or the state.  It indicates that others – 
those in power – should deal with these issues and that villagers 
are powerless.  This attitude is not surprising given the legacy of 
the past: complete exclusion of citizen participation in these 
matters in the planned economy, a very restricted role learned 
through years of activism, and exclusion from compensation 
negotiations in the second phase.  The thought itself, however, 
also steers their current and future action.  It marks a belief that 
nothing can change, action is ineffective, and the best thing they 
can get is a little money, which becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
D. The Compensation Frame 
The third discursive framework shaping community 
regulation is the compensation frame.  Following years of 
responding to pollution by demanding and receiving 
compensation, villagers have started to view pollution damage in 
terms of its relevance for compensation.  In response to our 
questions about what can be done, many answered that they can 
get some compensation.  In addition, when asked how the 
situation can finally be solved, villagers often referred to 
compensation.  Even when asked what the ultimate solution to 
the problems was, they never replied that pollution should be 
controlled or that the most polluting parts of the factories should 
be closed.  Instead, they answered that the ultimate solution 
would be compensation so they could relocate.144  We have seen 
 
head for instance told us pollution is a necessary part of development (Apr. 29, 
2009). 
 144. See e.g., Interview by Yunmei Wu, Yiyun Zhang, and Anna Lora 
Wainwright, with Middle Aged Female Villager in Baocun, China (May 10, 
2009) (interview transcript on file with author); Interview by Yunmei Wu, Yiyun 
Zhang, and Anna Lora Wainwright, with Niece of Village Leader in Baocun, 
China (May 10, 2009) (interview transcript on file with author); Interview by 
Yunmei Wu, Yiyun Zhang, and Anna Lora Wainwright, with Elder Male 
Villager in Baocun, China (May 11, 2009) (interview transcript on file with 
author). 
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that industry and local leaders have used this framework to 
control citizen activism and to keep it within the confines of 
redress-related claims, which preclude regulation of pollution.  In 
instances where villagers expressed worries about their health 
and safety, the factory and local leaders reframed their worries in 
terms of redress and compensation.  For instance, after the 2008 
explosion, villagers worried about their safety and demanded to 
be relocated, which they saw as the only way to finally solve the 
matter.  The factory responded by ignoring their demands, 
stressing that if they got evidence of damage they could bring it 
up again, thus reframing their demands in compensatory terms 
which did not address the people’s concerns about future health 
hazards.  Similarly, health concerns and related claims for check-
ups have been responded to, time and again, by being ignored or 
refused and always matched by a little payment.  This seems to 
have been effective.  When asked why another village did get 
medical check-ups, one of the leading local activists explained, 
“The pollution in that village is limited, and they do not get 
pollution compensation any more.  If Tazu gets health check-ups 
but no pollution compensation, that is not worth it; we no longer 
get money.”145 
Therefore, experiences with compensation and related 
collective action that originally developed in the second stage and 
continued in the third stage become set in frameworks that stress 
redress instead of regulation.  These frameworks resonate well 
with a socio-economic context of dependence on industrial sources 
of income and a political climate of co-optation, opportunism, and 
control. 
VI. CONCLUSION: THE COMPENSATION TRAP 
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
This study has analyzed a particular, localized pattern of 
community-based pollution regulation. It differs greatly from 
forms of community regulation studied in the existing literature, 
which have largely looked at non-localized forms of action 
involving media, government authorities, and legal measures.  As 
 
 145. Interview with Niece of Village Leader, supra note 92. 
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we have analyzed elsewhere, the existing studies and data 
available so far have shown that Chinese citizens have gone to 
court, complained to the authorities, and protested outside their 
locality, with varying degrees of success in terms of compensation 
and sometimes even pollution control.146  This article provides a 
unique view of what happens in cases where data has not yet 
been accessible, simply because citizens never reached the media, 
courts, or government bureaus. 
In the localized pattern studied here, citizens have become 
caught in a compensation trap.  Compensation, for land usage 
and for pollution-related damage, has become an overarching end 
that influences means that could normally be used for 
community-based regulation.  As pollution damage continues, 
grievances and demands are shaped by compensation.  This 
means that citizen demands will only be made for damage where 
redress is possible and for which there is a level of certainty and 
hard evidence.  It also means that the demands themselves 
emphasize redress and not control or prevention of pollution.  
Action organized in the village is also strictly aligned with the 
search for compensation.  Collective action like blockades has 
supported leadership negotiations for pollution redress payments, 
while action that involves outside support from the state, media, 
or civil society has been less prevalent, as it is considered to 
negatively affect compensation payment.  Meanwhile, pollution 
compensation payments are relatively small and are not directly 
calculated based on the actual damage that citizens incur.  They 
especially do not involve damage where the linkage to pollution is 
not certain or damage that may occur in the future, such as 
health-related issues.  When asked, villagers responded that the 
compensation paid indeed does not make up for the damage they 
have incurred.  Their acquiescence is understandable given the 
evolution of community-based regulation.  The compensation 
payment is small, and it seems to have a very limited regulatory 
effect on the local industries that know they must pay every now 
and then to keep the villagers quiet.  Here, the compensation 
agreements and the collective activism lack a clear normative 
function; we have received little to no indication that norms were 
 
 146. See van Rooij, supra note 25, at 65-67. 
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invoked regarding what the factories are allowed or prohibited to 
emit.  Quite to the contrary, compensation payments have become 
a license to pollute.  For example, any normative elements are 
hidden by framing compensation contracts in terms of agriculture 
instead of pollution.  Meanwhile, a view has started to develop in 
which villagers are tied to compensation in such a way that they 
are no longer seen as the victims of pollution.  Rather, they are 
seen as greedy opportunists who will try everything possible to 
get more money from the industrial complex in their midst.  
Thus, the compensation trap springs shut. 
There are several interrelated explanatory factors for this 
failure.  The first one is the legacy of a planned economy in which 
villagers had only limited citizenship and where the state and 
collective industry compensated voluntarily, without being 
pressed by the local community or even the state.  Second, the 
processes of industrialization have not only caused the pollution 
that the community has been unable to control but have also 
created a stratification that divided the pollution victims and 
established a web of interdependencies between the villagers, 
migrants, the industrial complex, the state, and the village 
leaders.  Third, the community’s capacities are limited; the 
villagers lack financial independence, pollution-related expertise, 
cohesion, and activist leadership.  Here also the imbalance 
between their income and that of the factory has made strong 
bargaining difficult.  The fourth factor is the role played by the 
local village leadership, which has made use of its intermediary 
position between the village and the industry to enrich the 
villagers and themselves while controlling acts that could 
endanger the newly acquired riches or their own position.  Here, 
the village leaders have been influenced by both the local 
factories and the state.  The fifth factor, then, is the role of the 
state: local governments protecting their tax base and preventing 
social unrest and environmental authorities failing to align the 
community to regulate pollution.  Here, national policy and law 
are involved.  Years of emphasizing development at the cost of the 
environment in national policy clearly play out in the locality’s 
short industrial history.  National legislation has strengthened 
the idea of compensation, by developing rights to compensation 
for directly affected victims instead of more broadly framed 
environmental rights or courses of action open to other civil 
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society organizations that are less likely to become caught in a 
local compensation trap.  Sixth, there are the development, 
pessimist, and compensation frameworks that have resulted from 
all of this and that influence and control grievance and action 
development. 
In this pattern of localized pollution regulation, unless 
community claims for compensation become sufficiently great to 
have a regulatory effect or communities make claims that go 
beyond redress (even payment for relocation) or engage 
successfully with regulatory agencies, communities are unlikely 
to have much impact on the environmental performance of 
factories in their midst.  The pattern studied here is of course not 
representative of all forms of community-based pollution 
regulation.  We know from existing studies based on publicly 
available data that there are many cases where citizens have 
issued complaints to local authorities, where they have gone to 
court, and sometimes have been able to get some compensation.  
Until now, we had limited knowledge about what happened in 
cases that were not made public in the media and in cases where 
activism is restricted to the locality.  Nor do we know much about 
the long-term regulatory effect, even in cases where citizens won 
compensation in court. 
Through inference we can hypothesize that in China, or 
countries with similar political and economic settings, many 
rural, industrializing communities may share similar issues 
obstructing effective community-based regulation: 
industrialization in developing countries may often have started 
in the context of a planned economy and authoritarian regime, 
with poor and uneducated villagers and a state that protects 
industry.  The question is whether the community develops 
interdependencies with the industry and what formal or informal 
local leaders the particular community has.  The greater the 
interdependencies, the greater seem the chances that community 
leaders will become co-opted as they did in this study.  When all 
five factors discussed above are in place, it is likely that 
controlling frameworks, similar to those studied here, will 
ultimately develop to feed acquiescence and acceptance and will 
obstruct community-based regulation of pollution. 
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The interrelated nature of these explanatory factors marks 
the resilience of the compensation trap and its obstacles to 
effective community-based regulation.  One can wonder what 
could possibly produce a change.  It is unlikely that the 
development of more rights by the state will translate into an 
effect in the local community, given how they are set in the 
existing frameworks and how small of a role the law has played 
in their midst.  Still, this article shows the importance of a 
broader view of what rights must be enshrined in the law, 
especially the right to a clean environment, apart from the 
compensation-oriented norms targeted at pollution victims.  It 
also shows that there is a real need for allowing public interest 
litigation by organizations that are not directly affected by the 
pollution, including state and non-state organizations.  There 
have been many calls for such provisions in China,147 which until 
now have remained without effect as legislators and key 
stakeholders, including the courts, have halted the development 
of such rights, amending legal drafts that included such 
provisions.148  An understanding of the pattern studied here, 
however, also leads to doubt about the effectiveness of such 
provisions.  It seems unlikely that any state or civic organization 
will be able to use such rights, which cynically enough are 
currently advocated by the local environmental court simply 
because they lack information about the local pollution problems.  
It seems that action must start from the local community.  This 
requires a belief that action involving outside actors is useful, and 
 
 147. Rachel Stern, Towards Environmental Public Interest Litigation? 
Proposals for Legislative Change (prepared for the Natural Resource Defense 
Council, 2008). 
 148. Interview by Benjamin van Rooij with Environmental Law Professor, in 
Beijing, China (May 5, 2008) (interview transcript on file with author); 
Interview by Benjamin van Rooij with Member of National People’s Congress 
Legislative Affairs Commission, in Beijing, China (May 17, 2008) (interview 
transcript on file with author); Interview by Benjamin van Rooij with 
Environmental Law Professor, in Beijing, China (May 14, 2008) (interview 
transcript on file with author); Interview by Benjamin van Rooij with 
Environmental Lawyer, in Beijing, China (July 14, 2008) (interview transcript 
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a belief that local problems ultimately require regulation, not just 
compensation. 
It seems the state environmental authorities will have a role 
to play after all.  Of all the external actors, they are the best 
equipped to know the local situation and to initiate a change in 
the local community.  Instead of regulating independently, 
environmental authorities can involve the local villagers in every 
step of their work.  Agents can communicate about what they are 
inspecting and compare their results with local knowledge in the 
community.  They can explain to what extent pollution is 
inevitable and to what extent it can be further reduced and 
controlled, thus trying to overcome the development discourse.  
They can try to convince communities that their enforcement 
action will not automatically shut down development and does 
not preclude separate claims made by villagers for compensation.  
As such, they can also get involved in compensation claims and 
help villagers gather the evidence they need. 
To conclude, it seems that the compensation trap may be 
broken if state regulation directly engages with community-based 
regulation, possibly also involving civil society organizations.  
This stresses the relevance of Gunningham’s observation that 
successful pollution regulation comes from a combination of state, 
social, and economic forces.149  In the contexts studied here, such 
a combination will not develop automatically and requires much 
steering from the state regulators involved. 
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